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Abstract
Oft en a distinction is made between interpersonal and institutional trust, as the for-
mer is defi ned in terms of encapsulated interests, that is the idea that somebody will 
take your interests into account. Scholars have argued that this cannot be applied 
to institutions and that generalized institutional trust is therefore not a meaningful 
concept. Th is article disputes this reasoning by distinguishing this kind of trust in 
the governance of capital cities from such trust in non-capital cities. It argues that 
it can be doubted especially for the local administration in capital cities that they 
predominantly have the interests of their residents in mind when making decisions. 
Th e resulting hypothesis that residents of capital cities have less trust in their local 
administration than residents of non-capital cities is tested and confi rmed through 
a secondary analysis of Urban Audit data. Th e analysis shows a signifi cant eff ect in 
the predicted direction, which remains strong when controlling for the satisfaction 
with public issues, the respective region, and poverty of the respondent. Th e con-
clusion is that citizens in municipalities do know whether or not local institutions 
have their interests in mind when making decisions, which makes institutional trust 
equally meaningful a concept as interpersonal trust.
Key words: 
interpersonal trust, institutional trust, trust in local administration, governance, 
capital cities, non-capital cities
1 Professor, Chair of the Department in Public Administration, Institute of Management Research, 
Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands. He conducts research within the 
Institute of Management Research.
2 Associate Professor, School of Public Administration, Gothenburg University, Gothenburg, Swe-
den.
10.2478/nispa-2018-0009
210
The NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, Vol. XI, No. 1, Summer 2018
1. Introduction
Living in a big city has benefi ts as ample facilities can be expected to be available. 
It has, of course, also its downsides, as there might be nuisances, such as a lot of 
noise, a bad quality of air, expensive housing, traffi  c congestion, safety issues et 
cetera. So, on the one hand, living in such a city involves high expectations about 
having a pleasant life, while on the other hand there are low expectations, about 
all the nuisances involved in living in such a city (Slack and Chattopadhyay 2009; 
Rossman 2016; van der Wusten 2000; Rowat 1973; Gottmann and Harper 1990; 
Mäeltsemees 2010).
In capital cities, the nuisances as well as available facilities are oft en even 
more extreme than in other big cities. Th e reasons, to be elaborated upon in this 
article, refer to the symbolic function of the capital for the country as a whole, 
its proximity to national government and the relative multitude of functions it 
therefore has to take care of. Th is could imply that capital cities act less on the 
behalf of their own residents and more on behalf of the country as a whole and its 
national government. If that is the case, its residents might have less trust in their 
local administration, as such trust is based on perceived encapsulated interests, 
that is the idea that the local administration will take its residents’ interests into 
account and is capable of meeting the high and low expectations of its residents. 
For all of the mentioned issues, local government has a responsibility of taking 
care thereof, and if local government does indeed take adequate care of them, 
residents might be inclined to trust that local government. Th e reasoning is that 
when your expectations are met, this implies that you judge the one responsible, 
that is the local administration, to have acted on your behalf and to be capable of 
doing so, which are the two main ingredients of trust.
Notwithstanding the inherent logic of such reasoning, it is a disputed kind 
of reasoning, as scholars have repeatedly argued that it is not meaningful to talk 
about such institutional trust. Th e late Russell Hardin (2000, 2002, 2013) has been 
the strongest proponent of that argument. His claim was that trust has to be seen 
in terms of encapsulated interests, that is, it being in the interest of the trusted one 
to act on the trustee’s behalf. As it is generally not known for government and its 
offi  cials whether they “act on my behalf ”, such institutional trust cannot be a mean-
ingful concept (Hardin 2002, 156). At most one could talk about confi dence in, or 
the trustworthiness of, government, which are rather diff erent concepts.
Th is article aims to combine Hardin’s reasoning about the nature of trust with 
an analysis showing that generalized trust is still a meaningful concept. We agree 
with Hardin that trust is about encapsulated interests and also about capabilities, as 
it is a three-way relation of A trusting B to do X. Regarding institutional trust, we 
argue that it is possible to distinguish between the local administration of diff erent 
cities, based on the doubts their residents can have that these local administrations 
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are inclined to act on their behalf. Th ese reasonable doubts are refl ected in the ac-
tual level of the local residents’ trust in the respective local administrations. Sec-
ondly, we will argue that citizens are aware of, i.e. “have knowledge of ”, the extent to 
which their expectations of living in their city are fulfi lled, and that they infer from 
this knowledge whether the local administration is capable to accomplish what is 
desired. Th is is also refl ected in their trust in the local administration.
Th is article, therefore, asks whether the outcomes of an analysis on the trust 
in the local administration of big cities, distinguishing between capitals and non-
capitals, point to the meaningfulness of the use of institutional trust. as comparable 
to interpersonal trust. In order to answer that question, the following sub-questions 
are consecutively addressed:
1. What does the distinction between interpersonal an institutional trust entail ?
2. What is so special about capital cities compared to non-capital cities that one 
might expect the trust in its administration to be lower ?
3. Is the trust in the local administration of capital cities indeed lower than in non-
capital cities ?
4. Does this relation hold when controlled for the satisfaction with the meeting of 
high and low expectations ?
5. What does this imply for the meaningfulness of institutional trust ?
We structure this article as follows. First, we give a short theoretical exposé on 
the discussion about the meaning of trust and the comparability of interpersonal 
and institutional trust. Th e article continues with an elaboration on the high and 
low expectations of living in European cities and capital cities in particular. Th is 
part of the article is based on existing literature, regarding the merits of living in 
(capital) cities. Th e methods section presents the data used – the Urban Audit – and 
the survey questions involved and refl ects on their validity and reliability to answer 
the research question. All this is the prelude for the presentation of the outcomes 
of testing the hypothesis that trust in the local administration is a function of its 
capabilities and encapsulated interests.
Th is kind of research is not only relevant because of its theoretical implica-
tions regarding institutional trust, but also because there is a growing concern about 
the distrust in government as “citizens’ trust in government is currently at a record 
low” (OECD 2017, 34). Th e World Bank in its 2017 yearly report notices that “Trust 
is a central aspect of strengthening governance and delivering on development. As 
such trust is said to be related to positive outcomes in terms of economic growth, as 
well as government performance” (World Bank 2017, 55), and if such institutional 
trust is indeed a meaningful concept, the task is to fi nd out what enhances and what 
decreases such institutional trust.
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2. Theory
2.1 Interpersonal and institutional trust
In the scholarly literature, a distinction is made between interpersonal trust and 
institutional trust. Th e former is oft en defi ned as a psychological state comprising 
the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the inten-
tions or behaviors of another. It is in the words of Seligman (2000, 43) “some sort 
of belief in the goodwill of the other, given the opaqueness of other’s intentions and 
calculations” or, as Russel Hardin defi ned it, the expectation of “encapsulated inter-
est”, that is, the knowledge that it is in the interest of the trusted to act on my behalf 
(Hardin in Warren 1999, 24).
Such interpersonal trust is assumed to be based on three factors. First of all, 
on the reliance that – regarding a person’s intentions and capabilities – the extent 
to which future expectations are met is not diff erent from past experiences. Trust 
in this sense is about building a reputation, involving the promise of fulfi lling ob-
ligations. Secondly, interpersonal trust can be based on common characteristics of 
the trustee and the trusted, as given in familiarity, background, gender, age, and 
ethnicity. You trust somebody, because he or she is like yourself, because you share 
strong basic evaluations and a set of moral values (Seligman 2000, 69). As you are 
most likely inclined to trust yourself, you are also inclined to trust somebody else 
if that person is like you. In that case, it will be more likely that it is in the interest 
of that other to act in your interest. Th irdly, trust can be based on institutional ar-
rangements, such as the existence of guarantees, rules and regulations, that ensure 
that others will do what they promise to do. It is not necessary that you trust the 
person as such to have an interest to act in your interest, but you accept the vulner-
ability of trusting him or her anyway, because you are assured that the person will 
have the right intentions and behavior, as he or she will otherwise be sanctioned 
(Costa 2000, 11).
As argued in the introduction it has been disputed whether the same kind of 
trust can be shown to institutions (cf. Luhmann 2017; Hardin 2000). We don’t know 
the intentions of institutions; if they are working in favor of government or citizens. 
Hence, all that is needed to warrant relations of trust with government is absent, 
and we cannot reasonably judge through experience whether it is in the interest of 
government to encapsulate our interests (cf. Warren 1999, 5).
Th is reasoning assumes that citizens hardly have any knowledge about the 
workings of the institution at stake. However, one can expect at least some knowl-
edge on the citizen’s part about the workings of government. Aft er all, in many 
countries, schools are encouraged, and sometimes even obligated, to teach subjects 
under such varying names as public aff airs, citizenship, humanities, social sciences, 
politics and economy. Th ere are newspapers, television and radio programs, nowa-
days supplemented with social media, that continuously inform us about the inter-
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nal and external workings of government. Citizens experience the quality of public 
life in their cities or rural areas and are able to judge the quality of the surroundings. 
Furthermore, public offi  cials continuously inform citizens why certain policies are 
needed, they account for their actions and provide arguments for their decisions 
in parliaments, local councils and through other channels. Talking about trust in 
public institutions, we may not be talking about interests that encapsulate one’s per-
sonal interests – in that regard the distance between the resident and its government 
might be too large, but we could talk about the extent to which it is in the interest of 
government to encapsulate the public interest. Do the interests of the local admin-
istration encapsulate the interests of the city ? Can we be assured that local admin-
istrations make decisions that are in the interest of the municipality, and is it in the 
interest of local administrations to do so ? Institutional trust is about the confi dence 
that the local administration’s prime concern is the well-being of the local residents 
and that it is capable of taking care thereof. Such trust is partly based on knowledge 
of the basic idea or “good” of the institution (cf. Off e in Warren 1999), partly based 
on what becomes public knowledge through all kinds of media channels, and partly 
based on the satisfaction with the outcomes of their actions. In this sense, institu-
tional trust in public organizations is comparable with interpersonal trust.
Such institutional trust is important as it results in compliance and support 
for the trusted institution, the ease with which diffi  cult decisions are accepted, and 
the willingness of citizens to coproduce policies together with that government. 
Research points to outcomes that people believing government to be competent 
are more likely to provide the critical resources to government and less inclined 
to evade taxes; generalized high-level trust is expected to encourage sociability, 
participation with others and to enrich social networks, because it makes people 
cooperate instead of fi ghting, makes them active, and encourages them to behave 
morally (Off e 1999, 122). Yamamura showed for Japan that institutionalized trust 
makes people more likely to express preferences for income redistribution and to 
perceive their tax burden as low (Yamamura 2012). On the other hand, lacking trust 
as a sign of no confi dence in the institutional arrangement of a system does in the 
end make the system collapse (Luhmann 2017), and if it does not collapse, it does 
at least need costlier ways of cooperation, namely through formal rules and regula-
tions, resulting in high transaction costs. Th erefore, distrust in society imposes a 
kind of tax on all forms of economic activity, a tax that high-trust societies do not 
have to pay (Fukuyama 1995, 27 – 28).
2.2 The functions of capital cities and the implications for trust in 
their local administration
This subsection argues that it is possible to distinguish (local) public adminis-
trations according to the degree to which they can be expected to act predomi-
nantly in the interest of their (local) residents, and to the degree to which they 
are able to meet their (local) residents’ high and low expectations, for which 
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they are at least partly held responsible. This distinction made is between capi-
tal and non-capital cities.
What makes a capital city special in terms of trusting its local administration 
is that, according to Mäeltsemees, “Each capital city has a certain symbolic mean-
ing to its state; the whole state is assessed based on its capital city … the capital city 
generally diff ers from the rest of the local governments of the state” (2010, 25). Th is 
symbolic function of capital cities is, fi rst of all, seen in their history, oft en with 
still existing remnants of the country’s ancient glorious times. Such remnants can 
refer to palaces; a cathedral or temple as a symbol of the location of the dominant 
religion in the country, with the (previous) head of the dominant denomination 
located there; and the place itself even seen as being the bridge between heaven and 
earth. Another historical vestige might be a large square or plaza, oft en named aft er 
the nation or a famous historical national hero, being symbolic and still in use for 
national manifestations. It is also seen in the location of cultural institutions such 
as (national) universities, national theatres, and national museums embodying the 
supra-local even national cultural heritage. Th irdly, capital cities are typically the 
location for political institutes. Th e government as the executive power oft en resides 
in the capital city, as do national assemblies, parliaments, senates and other legisla-
tive powers. Both executive and legislative powers share the fact that they symbolize 
the concentration of political power in that specifi c locality.
Th e capital city is, therefore, the symbol of national unity, of political power, and 
of the level of development of a country. As Gottman and Harper (1990) indicated:
Th e capital is by defi nition a seat of power and a place of deci-
sion-making processes that aff ect the lives and the future of the 
nation ruled, and that may infl uence trends and events beyond 
its borders. Capitals diff er from other cities, as the capital func-
tion secures strong and lasting centrality; it calls for a special 
hosting environment to provide what is required for the safe and 
effi  cient performance of the functions of government and deci-
sion-making characteristics of the place (63).
Th e few scholars who analyzed life in capital cities all emphasized the ad-
ditional functions and challenges of such localities, because of their triple role in 
maintaining livability for residents, being the principal locus of national economic 
success, and acting as the window of the country to the outside world to attract 
foreign investments. Th ese multiple priorities result in a spread of concrete policy 
areas to address.
Logan (2005) argued, “Such cities perform functions at three levels … a capital 
city is a city for all of the nation’s citizens and performs functions for the whole na-
tion. Th ese functions are at both the national level … and international level” (560). 
Th e consequences are also clear, as Douglas (2005) notes:
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Capital cities invariably acquire higher per capita shares of the 
national public purse than other cities. Th is would seem to give 
great advantage to the residents of these cities. However, how 
these resources are allocated, whether they are suffi  cient in the 
face of stresses on these cities, and who actually benefi ts are es-
sential questions in need of answers before such a sanguine con-
clusion can be reached (543).
Th e multiplicity of goals results in specifi c issues for capital cities. Oft en men-
tioned are the population growth, the resulting excessive housing prices, traffi  c con-
gestion, air-pollution, the continuous noise, and the resulting need to maintain and 
increase divertissements. House prices are generally highest – for most EU Member 
States – in their capital city. Th is is particularly true in the Czech Republic, where 
the average price of a house in Praha is almost fi ve times as high as the national 
average. It is also true elsewhere, with house prices in London, Paris, Amsterdam 
and Stockholm far exceeding those in the rest of the respective countries. In other 
countries, it is typical to fi nd house prices in capital cities around twice as high as 
national averages (Statistics on European Cities 2017).
Capital cities have the potential to play a crucial role in urban developments; 
they are oft en hubs for competitiveness and employment and may be seen as driv-
ers of innovation and growth, as well as centers for education, science, social, cul-
tural and ethnic diversity. Th is is supported by their having an advantage in profi t-
ing from new developments, such as primary nodes in networks of (high speed) 
railways, Internet, and international airports. Scholars have also argued that this 
increases the attractiveness of capital cities (European Cities Monitor 2002, 159). 
Th ey continue by arguing that the performance of capital cities is supported by the 
quality of the workforce, access to markets and external transport links, and they 
conclude by stating; “[O]ut of the 30 top performers, 20 are capital cities” (Euro-
pean Cities Monitor 2002, 159).
Th e above implies that positive (high) expectations about cultural facilities, 
infrastructure, public spaces, employment opportunities et cetera might be more 
extreme in capital cities than in non-capital cities, and that negative (low) expecta-
tions about nuisances involved in living in a city might also be more extreme in a 
capital city than in a non-capital city.
Th e implications of having the national government and political power with-
in one’s borders could also be huge for the trust in the local administration of capital 
cities. As van der Wusten (2000) explained:
Nowadays capital cities have a considerable segment of civil ser-
vants in their resident population … All these functions in their 
turn attract other service providers that then become relevant for 
diff erent purposes (museum quarters as part of the general tour-
ist attraction, the hosting environment as an asset in the interna-
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tional conference business, the presence of political authority to 
attract functions from a diff erent system of governance) (130).
Hence, the composition of a capital city will diff er from the population else-
where in the country and on a micro administrative level the relations among public 
offi  cials working at diff erent levels might be closer. Th is might impact the turnover 
of individual public offi  cials between the national and local levels. As remuneration 
at the national level is mostly higher than at the local level, the probability might 
increase that the brightest local politicians and civil servants are transferred to the 
higher level, leaving the municipality with mediocre civil servants. In terms of trust-
ing the local administration all this could have a negative eff ect, as it is not self-evi-
dent that the local administrators have the interest of the residents of the capital city 
in mind, or their own interests in becoming an administrator at the national level.
Th e proximity to national governments could also result in confl icts. As Rowat 
indicated in 1973 regarding capital cities in federal systems, “Th e federal govern-
ment wants to control and develop the national capital in the interest of the nation 
as a whole, while the people of the capital naturally wish to govern themselves to the 
greatest extent possible” (Rowat 1973, xi).
Th e proximity to national government might also infl uence the opinions of 
local offi  cials regarding core issues, such as centralization, decentralization, and in-
tergovernmental relations in general. Where decentralization is said to be benefi -
cial for citizens, centralization is advantageous for capital cities, thus distinguishing 
them from other municipalities. As the OECD (2005) noted, decentralization oft en 
comes at the cost of the capital city, as infrastructure tends to become more decen-
tralized in terms of hubs for airports and high-speed trains.
Furthermore, one can ask who is governing the capital city. Are the locally 
elected or appointed politicians in charge, or is it national government that makes 
the decisions, and what does that imply for policy-making, public participation, 
and the residents ? As van der Wusten (2000) argued:
Capital cities are of necessity simultaneously places where na-
tional decisions are taken and executed, where international 
decisions are prepared and meetings for that purpose are oft en 
convened, and places showing to the domestic public and the out-
side world what the state is, what the national identity is, and 
how the polity imagines the rest of the world in light of its own 
position (131).
Th is could make the residents doubtful about the prime interests of the local 
administration in their city and whether it is predominantly the national or local 
interest that is encapsulated in the local administration’s interests.
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Th e proximity of national government to the capital city is thus expected to di-
minish the generalized institutional trust of the residents of such cities in their local 
administration. Th ose residents are right in questioning the extent to which it is the 
local administration that runs the city, or whether it is national government. Th ey 
also cannot be convinced of the capability of their local administration because of 
the turnover rate between local and national administration in capital cities.
Th erefore, the residents of the capital city might worry about the interests that 
dominate the decisions made by their local administration. Th ey cannot be sure 
that their own interests as citizens are encapsulated in those decisions.
Th is argument can be furthered as the economic development of the coun-
try as a whole is oft en heavily dependent on the development of its capital city. It 
was calculated for Greece that its GDP would be 19.9 % lower without Athens; the 
GDP in France would fall 15 % without Paris; the Czech GDP would diminish 4.2 % 
without Prague; and Poland would lose 9.6 % of its GDP without Warsaw. Th e only 
country in Europe which does not have an excessive GDP contribution from its 
capital city is Germany (IDW 2014).
Because of all this, the hypothesis is that residents of capital cities will have less 
trust in their local administration than the residents of non-capital cities, as there 
can be reasonable doubts whether the interests of the residents are encapsulated 
in the decisions made by local administrations in capital cities. Th is hypothesis is 
tested in the subsequent part of this paper.
3. Methods
We test this hypothesis fi rst by comparing the opinions of citizens in pairs of cities 
within a country and do that for all pairs of cities for which information is available. 
Th e data used are derived from the Urban Audit. Th e Urban Audit conducted “a 
survey in June 2015 to measure the local perceptions of quality of life in 79 cities in 
the 28 Member States of the European Union and cities in Iceland, Norway, Switzer-
land and Turkey” (European Commission 2010), Earlier surveys were conducted in 
2004, 2006, 2009 and 2012. For the survey in 2015, 41,000 people were interviewed. 
It includes a range of questions to citizens to express their views on various aspects 
of urban life. Th e survey exclusively focuses on quality of life, showing how satisfi ed 
people are with various aspects of urban life, such as employment opportunities, 
presence of foreigners, public transports and pollution in their cities. It is designed 
to allow cities to compare themselves on 30 criteria addressing social, economic, 
cultural and environmental issues. In each of the 79 cities approximately 500 citi-
zens were interviewed. Th e Urban Audit does not incorporate multiple cities in all 
countries. Th is is, however, the case in the following 19 countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Finland, France, Germany, Hun-
gary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Spain, 
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Sweden and Turkey. In each of these countries we created pairs of cities of which 
one is the capital and one is a non-capital city. Th is results in the 19 pairs of cities 
are given in the table in the next section.
Opinions on trust between these pairs of cities are compared, and the con-
sistency in the diff erences over all 19 pairs determines whether the diff erences are 
statistically signifi cant. Th e signifi cance is determined with a paired sample t-test. 
If the diff erences are consistently in the same direction and are large enough, the T-
value will achieve a high value. Considering that n–1 is 18 degrees of freedom, this 
results in either a p-value larger than 0.05, implying the diff erence is not signifi cant, 
or a p-value smaller than 0.05, implying the diff erences are signifi cant. Th e main 
diff erence is that one city in each pair is a capital city and the other not, and there-
fore diff erences found are due to that factor.
Th e indicators for residents’ trust in the local administration are measured 
through their opinions to what extent they agree or disagree with the statements: 
“Generally speaking, the administration in this city can be trusted.”
Aft er this analysis, we present the outcomes of a logit model for dichotomous 
data aimed at explaining the trust in the local administration in all cities and includ-
ing control factors, such as the satisfaction with positive and negative expectations, 
as well as two control variables indicative for the prosperity of the respondents, 
namely whether they have problems paying their bills, and the region in which the 
country is located (CEE country or Western European country).
Based on the survey of 2012, we constructed two scales, each consisting of six 
items. Th e fi rst scale on the satisfaction with high-expectation issues was construct-
ed around six items with a reliability of 0.60. It is based on the following question:
Generally speaking, please tell me if you are very satisfi ed, rather satisfi ed, rather un-
satisfi ed or not at all satisfi ed with each of the following issues in [CITY NAME]?
• Cultural facilities such as concert halls, theatres, museums and libraries
• Sports facilities such as sport fi elds and indoor sport halls
• Health care services, doctors and hospitals
• Public transport, for example the bus, tram or metro
• Schools and other educational facilities
• Public spaces such as markets, squares, pedestrian areas
Th e second scale is on the satisfaction with low-expectation issues and was 
constructed around the following six items with a reliability of 0.66. It is based on 
the following question:
Generally speaking, please tell me if you are very satisfi ed, rather satisfi ed, rather un-
satisfi ed or not at all satisfi ed with each of the following issues in [CITY NAME]?
• Th e state of the streets and buildings in your neighborhood
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• Th e quality of the air
• Cleanliness
• Th e noise level
• I feel safe in [CITY NAME]
• I feel safe in my neighborhood
Th is modeling aims at fi nding direct and interaction eff ects on trust. Th e anal-
ysis asks whether living in a capital city intensifi es or mitigates the eff ects of these 
factors and whether by including those factors still a signifi cant direct eff ect of liv-
ing in the capital city on trust in the local administration remains.
4. Outcomes of the analysis
4.1 Trust in local administration
Th is section presents the outcomes of the research. Table 1 presents the outcomes 
on the opinions about the trust in the local administration comparing residents of 
capital cities with the next major city in the same country.
Table 1 shows that the trust in the administration varies among capital cit-
ies and among the opinions of residents living in capital and non-capital cities. In 
some capital cities, such as Rome, Madrid, Lisbon, Bucharest, Bratislava, and So-
fi a, all Southern European and CEE country capitals, trust in the administration is 
minimal. Opposite thereto, a vast majority of the residents of Berlin, Brussels, Paris, 
Stockholm, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Helsinki, London, and Wien (all Northwest 
European capital cities) do trust the administration in their city. So, in this regard, 
there is a North-West South-East divide. However, the diff erences within countries 
are signifi cant. Th is is especially seen in Bulgaria, Spain, Rumania, and Slovakia 
with more than 17 points diff erences. Over all 19 pairs, the pairwise comparison 
between capital and non-capital cities in the same country results in a statistically 
signifi cant diff erence in trust levels to the detriment of the local administration in 
capital cities (T=–3.45 df=18 p=0.003).
Hence, the generalized institutional trust in the local administration in capital 
cities is signifi cantly less than the trust in the local administration in their partner 
city in the same country. On average, there is almost an eight-point diff erence. Th e 
main exceptions are Stockholm and Paris, which according to their residents have 
an even more trustworthy administration, than the ones in Malmö and Marseille, 
respectively.
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Table 1
Generalized institutional trust in the local administration
Capital city The administration in this city can be trusted Partner city
Point 
difference
Amsterdam 57* 65 Rotterdam –8
Ankara 57 60 Diyarbakir –3
Berlin 59 68 Dortmund –9
Bratislava 27 44 Kosice –17
Brussels 70 69 Antwerp 1
Bucharest 42 65 Cluj –23
Budapest 63 58 Miskolc 5
Copenhagen 74 79 Aalborg –5
Helsinki 73 72 Oulu 1
Lisbon 45 68 Braga –23
London 65 68 Manchester –3
Madrid 38 60 Oviedo –22
Paris 63 57 Marseille 6
Prague 36 51 Ostrava –15
Rome 26 29 Napoli –3
Sofi a 45 63 Burgas –18
Stockholm 77 70 Malmö 7
Warsaw 49 60 Gdansk –11
Wien 76 83 Graz –7
* 57 % of the residents of Amsterdam say they trust the local administration as compared to 65 % 
of the inhabitants of Rotterdam giving an 8-point diff erence
Does such trust also depend on the satisfaction with high and low expectation 
issues ? Table 2a and 2b show that this is indeed the case.
Table 2a and 2b show that the two scales on satisfaction with high- and low-
expectation issues both have an equally strong impact on the trust in the local ad-
ministration. In general, 63.2 % of the residents of big cities show trust in their local 
administration, but this rapidly declines when being dissatisfi ed with more high-
expectation issues. Being dissatisfi ed with all high-expectation issues results in only 
a 21.3 % probability that the respondent will trust the local administration, while 
being satisfi ed with all six high-expectation issues results in an 81.9 % probability 
that the respondent will trust the local administration. Th e relation is strongly lin-
ear, as each point decrease in satisfaction with such issues results in approximately 
a 10 % lower probability one will trust the local administration.
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Exactly the same results are visible for the impact of satisfaction with low-
expectation issues. For both scales, the relation with trust is equally strong (γ=0.45 
and 0.46 respectively, both highly signifi cant with a p< 0.000).
Both analyses already provide a preliminary answer to the question whether 
the concept of generalized institutional trust can be applied in a meaningful way to 
the trust in (local) governments. Th e satisfaction with positive and negative expec-
tation issues as well as the varying doubts about the encapsulated interests of the 
local administration in capital and non-capital cities, have the expected and statisti-
cally signifi cant eff ect on the (dis)trust in the local administrations of those cities.
4.2 Trust in the local administration explained using a binary logit 
model
Th e question is whether these eff ects stay strong and signifi cant if controlled for 
region, being a capital city, and wealth of the respondent. Table 3 gives the outcomes 
of a binary logistic regression with trust in the local administration as the depen-
dent variable and the satisfaction with low- and high-expectation issues, living in a 
capital or non-capital city, the region, and wealth of the respondent as independent 
variables. In the fi rst column, the eff ects are shown and in the last column the odds 
ratios are presented. All eff ects remain strong and signifi cant.
Table 3
Binary logistic regression on trust in the local administration
B S. E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Satisfaction low-expectation issues .303 .007 1,677.064 1 .000 1.353
Satisfaction high-expectation issues .332 .008 1,594.234 1 .000 1.393
CEE countries –.326 .027 147.523 1 .000 .722
Poor –.194 .024 64.785 1 .000 .823
Capital city –.216 .024 80.909 1 .000 .806
Constant –.371 .028 170.386 1 .000 .690
Model Summary
Step –2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square
1 45,732.488a .124 .169
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than 
.001.
Table 3 shows that all the direct eff ects of living in a capital or non-capital 
city have the expected eff ects on trust in local administration. Th e odds ratio that 
one trusts the local administration when one lives in a capital city instead of a non-
capital city is 0.81. Th e odds ratio that one trusts the local administration when one 
is poor instead of having no problems paying the bills is 0.82; the odds of trusting 
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the local administration for persons living in a CEE country instead of a Western 
country is 0.72. All this implies that the probability of trusting the local administra-
tion is lower, when people are poor, live in a capital, and in a CEE-country. When 
people are satisfi ed with issues on which they have high expectations, the odds that 
they trust the local administration are 2.5 times as high as for people who are dis-
satisfi ed with such issues. Each additional issue one is satisfi ed with results in an 
increase of approximately 35 – 39 % in the odds that one trusts the local administra-
tion compared to the situation in which one is dissatisfi ed with this issue. Regarding 
low-expectations issues, if they are still satisfi ed with them, the odds that they trust 
the local administration are also 2.5 times as high compared to residents who are 
dissatisfi ed with such issues. Th is implies that in general, trust in the local adminis-
tration more than doubles when people are satisfi ed with either kind of social issues.
4.3 Interaction effects
A closer analysis shows that there are not only direct eff ects of these factors on trust, 
but also multiple interaction eff ects. Loglinear modeling shows that there are in 
total nine statistically signifi cant interaction eff ects.
We are especially interested in the interaction eff ects involving trust and ei-
ther high or low expectations. For instance, the probability of trusting the local 
administration in non-capital cities is on the whole higher than trusting the local 
administration in a capital city. Th e impact on trust of living in a capital or non-
capital city in CEE-countries is much larger than in Western countries (odds ratios 
for distrust are 0.34 and 0.42 in Western countries for non-capital and capital cities 
respectively, and 0.35 and 0.63 respectively for residents in non-capital and capital 
cities in CEE countries).
A major example of interaction eff ects is also that the combination of dissat-
isfaction with high-expectation issues combined with living in a CEE country has 
an additional eff ect on increased distrust (Odds ratio = 2.31). In Western countries, 
it is especially the dissatisfaction with low-expectation issues that has such an ad-
ditional eff ect (Odds ratio = 2.26).
A third example is the interaction eff ect found in the combination of being 
dissatisfi ed with high- and low-expectation issues and living in a Western capital. 
It makes the probability of distrusting the local administration increase signifi -
cantly, compared to having the same dissatisfaction while living in a CEE country 
(Odds ratio = 3.38). Th e interaction eff ect between the two types of satisfaction 
on trust is also noticeable in CEE countries, but it is smaller in those countries 
(Odds ratio = 2.50).
Poverty in combination with dissatisfaction with low expectations also has a 
small, additional eff ect on increased distrust, but it is minor compared to the inter-
action eff ects discussed above (Odds ratio = 1.17).
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Th is is illustrated in Table 4, where we give the eff ects of both kinds of satis-
faction and poverty on trust in the local administration in four contexts, based on 
living in a capital city or not and living in a CEE country or not.
Table 4
Th e infl uence of the context on the eff ects of satisfaction on trust 
in the local administration
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No Western 19,845 68.0 2.58 2.79 .71 .21 73 %
No CEE 4,314 59.9 2.59 2.40 .87 (ns) .18 67 %
Yes Western 9,671 62.4 2.48 2.33 .68 .19 69 %
Yes CEE 4,779 46.9 2.22 2.15 1.01 (ns) .14 63 %
Th e fi rst two columns in the table give the four distinct contexts, based on the 
respondent being resident in a capital city or not, and living in a Western or CEE 
country. Th e third column gives the number of respondents within each context, 
followed by the percentage of them trusting the local administration in general. 
Th is column shows that trust in local administrations is especially low for residents 
of capital cities in Central and Eastern European countries. Th e next three columns 
give the eff ects of the independent variables on trust. Given are the odds ratios 
(exp (β)), indicating the increase or decrease in the probability of trusting the local 
administration when the independent variable changes to the value as given. Th us, 
when respondents are satisfi ed with low-expectation issues, they are 2.58 times as 
likely to trust the local administration compared to those who are dissatisfi ed with 
low-expectation issues. When the odds ratio are below 1 – as is the case for the eff ect 
of poverty – the probability of trust decreases when the independent variable has 
the assigned value (sometimes / oft en having trouble paying the bills) compared to 
respondents having the opposite value (never problems to pay the bills). Th e last two 
columns give statistics about the model as a whole, that is, the variance explained, 
and the percentage of people that are correctly classifi ed as trusting or distrusting 
the local administration based on their scores on the independent variables.
Th e eff ect of satisfaction with low-expectation issues on trust seems to be the 
most robust. It hardly varies over the distinguished contexts, although it is some-
what lower in capital cities in CEE countries. Th is is diff erent for the eff ect of sat-
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isfaction with high-expectation issues as well as for the eff ect of poverty on trust. 
Th e eff ect of poverty on trust in the local administration is signifi cant and in the 
expected direction in Western countries, irrespective of living in a capital city or 
not. If a person is (sometimes) unable to pay the bills and lives in a Western coun-
try, it does impact on his / her trust in the local public administration. Th is eff ect 
is not visible in CEE countries, as its eff ect is insignifi cant in these countries. Th is 
might be explained by the more extended coverage of social benefi ts in Western 
countries as compared to those in CEE countries, making it understandable that 
individuals in Western countries are more inclined to blame the insuffi  cient social 
benefi ts received from the local administration if one gets into payment defi cits. 
As for the eff ect of satisfaction with high-expectation issues, although the eff ect is 
in the same direction in all four distinguished contexts, its eff ect within capital cit-
ies is smaller than in non-capital cities. Th is is the case in CEE countries as well as 
Western countries. Th ese are illustrations of some of the interaction eff ects found 
through loglinear modeling.
5. Conclusions
Th is article compared the level of generalized institutional trust in local administra-
tion in capital and non-capital cities in Europe. Such institutional trust was con-
ceived in similar terms as interpersonal trust, namely in terms of encapsulated in-
terests and fulfi lling expectations. Th is article fi rst analyzed why there can be more 
doubt about the inclination of a capital city’s local administration to act on behalf of 
its residents, than in non-capital cities. Especially the symbolic and economic func-
tions of capital cities for the nation as a whole and issues related to the proximity of 
capital cities to national government were found to result in doubts whether deci-
sions by the local administration are made mainly with the interests of its residents 
in mind, which is the fi rst condition for trust. Secondly, it was argued that high as 
well as low expectations might be more extreme in capital cities than in non-capital 
cities and that the extent to which these expectations are met further impacts on the 
trust in the local administration.
Th is resulted in the hypothesis that generalized institutional trust in the local ad-
ministration of capital cities is signifi cantly lower than such trust in non-capital cities.
In our re-analysis of Urban Audit data (European Commission 2010), we 
compared the opinions of residents of capitals with those of residents in secondary 
cities in the same country. Th at secondary analysis shows that signifi cant diff er-
ences do emerge. Residents of capital cities do indeed have signifi cantly less trust 
in their local administration than residents of secondary cities. It was also shown 
that satisfaction with the extent to which high and low expectations are met does 
signifi cantly infl uence the trust in the local administration. If such satisfaction is 
completely absent, about 20 % of the residents have trust in their local administra-
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tion, whereas more than 80 % of the residents that are completely satisfi ed with the 
extent to which their expectations are met show institutional trust. Th ese relations 
remain signifi cant in a multivariate analysis, controlling for other relevant factors. 
Loglinear modeling showed the signifi cance of several interaction eff ects, especially 
showing that the impact of satisfaction with expectations on the generalized insti-
tutional trust is stronger in non-capital cities than in capital cities, and stronger in 
CEE countries than in Western European countries.
Th e main conclusion is twofold. First, generalized institutional trust is com-
parable to interpersonal trust, as generalized trust also depends on the knowledge, 
or doubts, that it is in the interest of the trusted actor to encapsulate the interests of 
the trustee, and that such trust also depends on the presumed capacity of the trusted 
one to fulfi l the expectations of the trustee. Second, living in a capital or non-capital 
city does make a signifi cant diff erence in terms of expectations about public is-
sues and being confi dent that the local administration is able to take care thereof. 
It does not make a diff erence whether we talk about the satisfaction with high- or 
low-expectation issues, e.g. whether it is about amenities or nuisances. Th e degree 
to which both kinds of expectations are satisfi ed has an equally strong eff ect on the 
trust in the local administration.
Of course, this study has its limitations as readers might judge the reasoning 
to be indirect, that citizens in capital cities have more doubts about the encapsula-
tion of their interests in the decisions of their local administration than citizens in 
non-capital cities. We acknowledge this, although it is hard to fi nd an alternative 
explanation for the diff erences in trust in the local administrations of capital and 
non-capital cities.
If the outcomes are accepted as valid, they have consequences for understand-
ing trust in other levels of government as well. If institutionalized trust can indeed 
be conceived in terms of encapsulated interests and fulfi lling expectations about 
public issues in the area for which such a public institution is primarily responsible, 
this has implications for the explanation of the decreasing trends in such general-
ized institutional trust at the national level, as well. If citizens start to doubt that 
national government acts on their behalf, and if they judge that their expectations 
about public issues are not met by the public institution they hold responsible, they 
will start to distrust that public institution. Th is could be the consequence of wide-
spread corruption in government, making people doubt whether government of-
fi cials act on their behalf. It could also be a consequence of – in itself benevolent 
– policies such as welcoming asylum seekers, aiding other countries, or signing in-
ternational treaties, where national inhabitants do not see the benefi ts or are con-
tinuously told by the media that these are not to their benefi t. Th is is especially the 
case if citizens lose trust that their government is able to solve the public issues that 
concern them, that is, when government does not live up to their expectations. In 
this regard, the globalization of governance, the hollowing out of government, the 
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failures in policies, and the ailing of public leadership might be causes for the low 
trust in government.
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